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Abstract—As demand for electric vehicles (EVs) is expanding, there is
much interest in meeting the need for charging infrastructure, especially
in urban areas. One method of adding charging stations is to install
them at parking spots. While there are costs to constructing spots with
chargers and they preclude regular internal combustion engine (ICE)
drivers from using these spots, EV drivers may have a higher valuation
for these spots due to their parking and charging demand. We look
at two models for how decisions surrounding investment in charging
stations on existing parking spots may be undertaken. First, we analyze
two firms who compete over installing stations under government set
mandates or subsidies. Given the cost of constructing spots and the
competitiveness of markets, we find it is ambiguous whether setting
higher mandates or higher subsidies for spot construction leads to better
aggregate outcomes. Second, we look at a system operator who faces
uncertainty on the size of the EV market. If they are risk neutral, we find
a relatively small change in the uncertainty of the EV market can lead to
large changes in the optimal charging capacity.
Index Terms—Parking, electric vehicles, congestion, game theory
1 INTRODUCTION
Though sales of electric vehicles (EVs) are increasing
rapidly, there are still barriers to their wide-spread adoption.
A survey by AAA found that “not enough places to charge”
was cited by 63% of consumers unwilling or unsure about
purchasing an electric car, making it the most common
reason cited [1]. While 80% of charging currently occurs at
home, in many areas (like densely populated urban areas)
the availability of at home charging may not be feasible. It
is thus important to study ways of making more charging
infrastructure available to the general public.
Federal and state governments have been pursuing
multiple strategies to increase charging infrastructure. One
method of increasing availability of charging is by inducing
private firms to install charging stations at parking spots.
For example, the city of Seattle is working with two private
firms to install EV charging stations throughout the city in
order to induce more EV drivers [2].
Given that these decisions affect not only the EV market
but also the market for ICE cars (who are excluded from
using designated charging spots), the potential effects of
such policies warrants investigation. As far as we know, this
is one of the first attempts to explicitly do so.
A variety of work has focused on optimizing EV charg-
ing, both in a competitive market and when system operator
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is looking at global welfare [5]–[9]. In [5] the authors analyze
the competition between charging stations (not necessary
in a parking context) with renewable generation. The effect
of EVs on the power grid and road system is studied in
[8], which offers ways system planners can optimize for
this. Our work differs from [5] by analyzing how firm’s
investment in parking affects the market for EVs and ICEs
and from [8] by focusing on parking rather than travel
decisions of EV drivers along road networks.
A key feature of parking is that it is a congestible re-
source, i.e., the more users that park in a given location, the
less desirable it is (on average) for the next user who parks
there. Commonly this effect is modeled with a congestion
cost term that is increasing in the number of users parking
in a given location [10]. We follow this approach here and
adopt a model similar to those used in the literature on
competition with congestible resources, e.g. [11]–[17]. In
particular [11] most closely resembles our model, as it looks
at wireless service providers pricing unlicensed and licensed
spectrum where consumers suffer congestion when other
consumers use the same band. We will similarly look at a
case where two classes of a market (parking for EV and ICE
drivers) are priced and where consumers suffer congestion
costs with other consumers of the same class, but differ as
each class of service can only serve one type of consumer.
There is a rich literature on examining the effect of prices
and competition on parking decisions by consumers and
the resulting welfare effects [10], [21]–[28]. The interaction
of parking and road usage congestion is examined in [21],
which shows a road-usage fee in addition to a parking fee
is needed to maximize welfare. The work in [22] builds
upon Vickrey’s classic bottleneck road congestion model to
examine how different pricing options can help maximize
welfare by reducing or eliminating congestion. The effect
of setting a minimum amount of parking for urban land
use, and how this reduces welfare compared to allowing
the market to decide the provision of spots is studied in
[25]. However, none of this work looks at situations where
both EV and ICE cars interact.
This paper focuses on the effect of government policy in
two cases: in the first incumbent private owners of parking
spaces are installing parking spots with charging stations
and in the second a monopolist owns all spots but has
uncertainty over the size of the EV market. In the first case
we consider how two policies affect these firms: namely
introducing subsidies for constructing EV charging spots
and setting a minimum proportion of spots that should have
chargers installed. This portion is built upon our earlier
2work [4]. We compare the electiveness of these policies
under different assumptions on how firms compete and
the relative market sizes of the EV and ICE markets. In the
second case, we study the impact of stochasticity in the more
valuable market (the EV market) on construction decisions
by a monopolist.
We assume a monopolist holds a mass of parking spots
in an area with many ICE drivers. Due to the potential
difficulties in forecasting the size of the future EV market,
they have some uncertainty on how large the EV market
may be. We will show both the monopolist’s expectation and
government policy can have a large impact on outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 defines the model for the competitive market; Section
3 analyzes the game as defined by this model; Section 4
summarizes the results from this model; Section 5 analyzes
a specific case study; Section 6 defines the model for the
monopolist; Section 7 examines the pricing structure in this
model; Section 8 examines the impact capacity decisions
have on the optimal operating point; Section 9 studies a
numerical case study for this model; Section 10 concludes
and looks at potential future work.
2 COMPETITIVE MARKET: MODEL
In this section we present our model for firms competing
over servicing EV and ICE drivers.
2.1 Consumers
We assume there is a mass of two classes of consumers:
drivers who use EVs and those who use ICE. Consumers
of both classes are assumed to be non-atomic. There will be
two types of parking spots: regular parking spots for ICE
drivers and spots equipped for charging EVs. We assume
each class of driver only parks in a spot designated for
them. This is true in practice for ICE drivers as there are
regulations against parking in spots with chargers, while
we assume all EV drivers require charge for their cars and
so would only consider parking in a spot with a charger
equipped.
As is standard in parking models we model the con-
gestion as a function of the proportion of occupied spots
[10]. This reflects that with higher occupancy each driver
has to spend more time on average to find a vacant spot. We
assume firms cluster spots of the same type together (i.e.,
those with charging and those without) and so consumers at
each firm’s parking location suffer congestion due to drivers
of the same class but not due to other class of drivers, nor
with any at the other firm. In general we want a congestion
function for each marginal consumer that is increasing in
the quantity of consumers already parked, decreasing in the
number of spots, and convex in the volume-capacity ratio
[10]. For simplicity we will use a linear congestion function,
which will be the same for both classes of consumers, i.e.,
S(q,N) = 
q
N
, (1)
where q is the quantity of that class of consumers already
parked, N is the number of spots allocated for that class
of driver, and  > 0 is a constant term that represents the
congestion cost if all spots are filled. Note, we have not put
any constraints on q and thus allow q > N . In this case
it would mean on average not only are all spots taken but
there are consumers cruising around for spots.
We do not model differences in the length of time a
consumer may want to park; they simply want access to the
ability to park (and will all pay the same price at a given firm
to do so as discussed in the firm section below). One can
think of this as a mass of drivers going to work, where they
all work the same amount of time. Each consumer therefore
purchases the same good, which is the ability to park during
the work day.
We will assume for both classes that there is a linear
downward inverse demand curve for parking determined
by the valuation and size of each market, which we define
for EV drivers (Pe(qe)) and ICE drivers (Pd(qd)) as
Pe(qe) = We(1− αqe), (2)
Pd(qd) = Wd(1− βqd). (3)
The y-intercept of the ICE inverse demand curve is Wd > 0,
and the slope is β > 0; while the y-intercept for the mass
of EV drivers is We > 0, and the slope is α > 0. Instead
of modeling explicitly the demand EV drivers have for a
certain amount of charge, for simplicity we assume that
access to charging results in a fixed additional utility over
parking. We capture this by assuming We > Wd, where
We captures both demand for the parking and the ability to
charge at the parking spot.
2.2 Firms
We assume there are two firms (i.e., parking garage owners)
that already own a mass of parking spots suitable for ICE
drivers. We normalize the number of total spots to be 1 and
the number of spots firm i has as Ni. Specifically, we define
the proportion of spots that firm 1 owns as N1 = δ, where
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. This means firm 2 owns N2 = 1 − δ spots.
Firms are unable to construct new spots, but either due
to government policy or their own choice they are able to
convert a portion of their spots to include an EV charger at
cost p. We will call the number of spots designated for EVs
at firm i as Nei and the remaining spots as Ndi.
We assume the firms are close together so on average
consumers have no preference for one firm over the other.
The model could be extended to assume all consumers are
attempting to get to a common location (for example a
central business district) where one firm may be closer and
thus preferred as in [23].
We define the value of parking for a marginal driver of
each class at each firm i when the firm sets a price mi (ci)
for ICE cars (EVs) and qdi (qei) ICE (EV) drivers are parked
at firm i as follows:
Uei(qe1, qe2, Nei, ci) = We(1− α(qe1 + qe2))
−  qei
Nei
− ci, (4)
Udi(qd1, qd2, Ndi,mi) = Wd(1− β(qd1 + qd2))
−  qdi
Ndi
−mi. (5)
3Here, the first terms reflect the inverse demands in (2) and
(3). The quantity of each class of driver at firm i is a function
of the number of spots available for that driver and the price
set for them both by firm i and the opposing firm j. The
number of consumers at each firm in equilibrium is defined
using the notion of a Wardrop equilibrium [29]. A Wardrop
equilibrium here means that when drivers are parking at
both firms, the following two conditions hold: the marginal
utilities of the consumers at each garage have to be equated
(Uei = Uej , Udi = Udj) and the marginal utilities have be
0 (Uei = 0, Uej = 0, Udi = 0, Udj = 0). This means that
consumers park until the marginal user would gain negative
utility from doing so, and sort themselves at the garage at
which they get the highest utility. Let N ei =
Nei
 , N

di =
Ndi
 , Ne = {Ne1, Ne2}, Nd = {Nd1, Nd2}, m = {m1,m2}
and c = {c1, c2}. Solving the system of equations given by
the Wardrop Equilibrium, we get the following closed-form
solution for the quantities serviced at firm i given the actions
of firm i and the opposing firm j when they both set a price
such that qei > 0 and qej > 0:
qei(Ne, c) =
We(1 + αN

ej(cj − ci))− ci
αWe(1 +
Nej
Nei
) + 1Nei
, (6)
qdi(Nd,m) =
Wd(1 + βN

dj(mj −mi))−mi
βWd(1 +
Ndj
Ndi
) + 1Ndi
. (7)
These equations were derived by assuming that there exist
a qei ≥ 0 and qej ≥ 0 such that the marginal utilities at each
firm are 0, which may not always be the case. In particular
this will not be true in two scenarios. First, if one firm sets
the number of spots for a given type of user to be 0, as this
leads to an infinite amount of congestion for that type of
user. If this happens to one firm and not the other, the above
solutions lead to one firm with non-zero capacity acting as
a monopolist and the other firm servicing a quantity of 0
for that class of driver as should occur. If they both set the
number of spots to be 0 then both quantities are 0 as is
expected. The second scenario is where a firm sets too high
a price so that the marginal utility of any driver parking
there in equilibrium is negative. We show in Appendix
10.1, that in any unilateral deviation away from the above
equilibrium, no firm would ever have such a price and so
there is no problem with ignoring this possibility. We can
therefore specify the general problem faced by each firm i:
max
Nei,Ndi,mi,ci
Πi = miqdi(Nd,m) + ciqei(Ne, c)− pNei
s.t. Nei +Ndi = Ni, Ndi ≥ 0, Nei ≥ 0. (8)
Note that each firm seeks to solve such a problem, and that
their decisions are coupled through the resulting Wardrop
equilbrium quantities. Also note that we set no constraint
for prices. This is because any negative price will result in
negative profit, while a price that is too large (for example,
mi > Wd) will result in no profit. These choices are therefore
dominated by setting the price to be 0 and so there is an
inferred constraint due to the nature of the optimization
problem. By not explicitly stating this constraint we will
be able to evaluate first-order conditions without having to
check for corner solutions.
2.3 Government
We assume the government wants to induce more charging
infrastructure to be constructed by firms. We will examine
two methods of doing so: issuing a mandate and subsidizing
construction. These are policies being currently explored
and implemented.
For the mandate, we define the proportion of spots
mandated for EV charging as r and incorporate this into
(8) by adding an additional constraint
Nei ≥ rNi. (9)
For the subsidy, we will allow the government to set a
subsidy s such that the cost of constructing EV spots for
firms as a function of the intrinsic cost t is
p = t− s. (10)
2.4 Consumer Surplus and Total Welfare
Given that consumers are non-atomic, then the consumer
surplus for each class of consumer is given by integrating
(4) and (5) over the quantity serviced at both firms, i.e.,
CSEV =
∫ qe1+qe2
0
We(1− αq)dq −∫ qe1
0
(
q
Ne1
+ c1)dq −
∫ qe2
0
(
q
Ne2
+ c2)dq, (11)
CSICE =
∫ qd1+qd2
0
Wd(1− βq)dq −∫ qd1
0
(
q
Nd1
+m1)dq −
∫ qd2
0
(
q
Nd2
+m2)dq. (12)
Note here we are assuming that drivers park sequentially
so that early drivers incur a lower congestion cost than later
drivers1. Each firm’s welfare will simply be the total profit
they receive given by the objective function in (8).
The government has to pay for any subsidies they offer
firms. We define the cost of subsidies as
G(Ne1, Ne2, s) = s(Ne1 +Ne2).
We therefore define the total welfare as the sum of consumer
surpluses, the firm profits, and the government’s cost to
provide subsidies, i.e.,
Wtotal = CSEV +CSICE+Π1 +Π2−G(Ne1, Ne2, s). (13)
3 COMPETITIVE MARKET: SEQUENTIAL SPOT AL-
LOCATION AND PRICING GAME
We model the overall market interactions as a one shot, two-
stage game. In the first stage, the firms simultaneously set
the number of parking spots they will convert to have charg-
ers. In the second stage they set prices having committed to
the number of installations they made in the first stage. We
will solve this game using backward induction, so we first
examine the second stage (where parking spot quantities
have already been set).
1. Alternatively, we could assume that all drivers park in “steady-
state” in which case all drivers would see the same congestion cost.
43.1 Second stage: Price competition
We will consider three different ways in which firms may
set prices given fixed quantities of parking spaces. These
will differ in the degree to which firms price discriminate
and anticipate the impact of EV parking. We begin with a
“two pricing case” in which firms discriminate in the prices
that they charge EV and ICE drivers accounting fully for the
different preferences of these two classes. However, around
50% of public chargers are free and thus it seems many
private owners of charging stations do not specifically set
a price to use that service [31]. We analyze two different
scenarios where this might occur. The first is where they set
a single price for both classes of drivers, but optimize that
price understanding EV drivers’ valuations. We call this the
“optimal single price case”. In the second case, we assume
that the garages had in the past (before constructing EV
spots) set prices to compete over only ICE drivers and then
maintain this price even after charging stations are added
to parking spots. We call this the “Naive” single price case.
Each of these pricing schemes could also arise in part due to
regulation that limits the prices that can be charged. We look
at each case separately. A summary of the cases is shown in
Table 1 below.
Case Constraint on Prices (ci, mi)
Two Price None
Optimal single price ci = mi
“Naive” single price set assuming Ne1 = Ne2 = 0.
TABLE 1: Firm Price Decisions
3.1.1 Two price case
In this case we assume that the firms each set two separate
prices: one for EV spots (c) and one for the ICE drivers (m).
The price for EVs can be thought of as the plug-in price on
top of the price of parking (so c = m + e, where e is this
plug-in price). In principle t could vary with the amount
of electricity an EV consumes while parked (and could also
vary with the underlying cost of electricity in a real-time
market). Here, we do not model such considerations and
simply view each EV as incurring the same additional cost t
(or equivalently we could view this as the average cost per
EV). We also do not explicitly model the length of stay for
each driver, so all drivers of the same class pay the same
cost at each firm’s location. Each firm in this stage seeks to
choose prices to maximize revenue. Note that in this stage
the cost of building parking spaces is sunk and so we can
ignore this when optimizing revenue. Also, once the spaces
are allocated the pricing decision for the two classes de-
couple and thus a firm’s optimal prices in response to the
price of its opponent are given by:
cBRi = argmax
ci
ciqei(Ne1, Ne2, c1, c2),
mBRi = argmax
mi
miqdi(Nd1, Nd2,m1,m2).
It can be shown that the objective in these optimization
problems is concave in the prices and so the solution can
be found by evaluating the first order optimality conditions
which yields:
cBRi (Nej , cj) =
We(1 + αN

ejcj)
2(αWeN ej + 1)
,
mBRi (Ndj ,mj) =
Wd(1 + βN

djmj)
2(βWdN dj + 1)
.
Hence, by solving for the fixed point of the best responses
we get the following expressions for the unique equilibrium
prices in the second stage:
c∗i (Ne) =
2αW 2eN

ei + αW
2
eN

ej + 2We
3α2W 2eN

eiN

ej + 4αWe(N

ei +N

ej) + 4
, (14)
m∗i (Nd) =
2βW 2dN

di + βW
2
dN

dj + 2Wd
3β2W 2dN

eiN

dj + 4βWd(N

di +N

dj) + 4
. (15)
3.1.2 Optimal single pricing case
In this case we assume that each firm only sets one price
that both EV drivers and ICE drivers pay to park (i.e., the
plug-in price is always 0). Each firm in this stage seeks to
choose a single price m to maximize revenue. Note again
that in this stage the cost of building parking spaces is sunk
and so we can ignore this when optimizing revenue. Thus a
firm’s optimal price in response to the price of its opponent
are given by:
mBRi = argmax
mi
mi[qei(Ne,m) + qdi(Nd,m)].
Again this objective can be shown to be concave in price,
and therefore we can find the solution by examining the
first order optimality conditions. Define
gmi (Ne,Nd,mj) = We
[
βWd(1 +
Ndj
Ndi
) +
1
N di
]
(1+
αN ejmj) +Wd
[
αWe(1 +
Nej
Nei
) +
1
N ei
]
(1 + βN djmj),
hmi (Ne,Nd,mj) = (αWeN

ej + 1)(βWd (1+
N dj
N di
)
+
1
N di
) + (βWdN

dj + 1)(αWe
(
1 +
Nej
Nei
)
+
1
N ei
).
Using these, the best response price for each firm is:
mBRi (Ne,Nd,mj) =
gmi (Ne,Nd,mj)
2hmi (Ne,Nd,mj)
. (16)
As before we can solve for the fixed point of these best
responses to get an expression for the equilibrium prices as
a function of the number of parking spots for each class of
driver (m∗i (Ne,Nd)). The expression contains many terms
and so is excluded from this write-up for clarity.
3.1.3 “Naive” single pricing case
In this case we also assume firms charge one price for
parking. However firms are “naive” about the entry of EVs
into the market and so maintain the parking prices they had
set before they had constructed EV chargers. Thus the best
response function for the single price they charge is
mBRi = argmax
mi
miqdi(Nd1 = δ,Nd2 = 1− δ,m1,m2).
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Fig. 1: Plots for α = 5
Note in this case the price is independent of any decision
made in the first stage of the game as the objective function
assumes Nd1 = δ, Nd2 = 1 − δ. Again, we can solve this
using the first-order optimality conditions to derive the best
responses and then solve for the fixed point. Defining N i =
Ni
 , this yields
m∗i =
2βW 2dN

i + βW
2
dN

j + 2Wd
3β2W 2dN

iN

j + 4βWdN

i + 4βWdN

j + 4
. (17)
3.2 First stage: Capacity competition
Next, we turn to the first stage in which firms decide on how
many EV spaces to construct accounting for the resulting
price equilibrium in the second stage. We will look at two
scenarios of how firms may respond to the government
mandate in this stage. In the pricing stage, we assumed
in some cases firms did not fully internalize their ability
to charge EV drivers a different price than ICE drivers.
We will do something similar in this stage. In one case
we assume firms “naively” follow the mandate while in
the other they will more intelligently choose the number of
spaces to optimize their objective function in (8). In the first
scenario, the firms simply meet the mandate (i.e., adding
Nei = rNi as a constraint in (8)). In the second scenario,
both firms optimize over the number of EV spots taking the
mandate as a lower bound (adding (9) as a constraint in (8)).
Table 2 summarizes these two scenarios.
Case Capacity constraint
“Naive” mandate fulfillment Nei = rNi
Optimal Capacity (9)
TABLE 2: Firm Capacity Decisions
4 COMPETITIVE MARKET: RESULTS
We now summarize the main results from analyzing the
overall equilibrium under the different scenarios.
Proposition 1. For the “naive” mandate fulfillment case, a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium exists and is unique for all pricing
schemes. In the optimal capacity case, a sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium exists if αWe ≤ 1 , βWd ≤ 1 and  = 1 for the two
price case and for any values in the “naive” single price case.
This proposition shows that under certain scenarios a
unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium exists. In general
a closed form expression for this equilibrium appears to be
difficult to obtain. In Section 5 we will instead numerically
analyze properties of these equilibria. The uniqueness of
the equilibria given in this theorem provides a guarantee
that our results will not depend on the algorithm used to
numerically find equilibria. The proof for this is provided in
the appendix.
Proposition 2. If the total number of spots across both firms for
a class of driver is fixed, then the quantity of that class of driver
serviced is maximized if when these spots are divided equally
across the firms.
This makes intuitive sense. If there is a fixed number of
spots for a given class of driver, the price will be lowest
when firms have equal market power and thus compete the
most. As a direct corollary to this we have:
Corollary 1. Consumer welfare is maximized when each firm
has the same initial endowment (δ = 0.5) and there is a unique
equilibria.
This follows from Proposition 2. When δ = 0.5, it can
be shown in all cases where equilibria are unique that each
firm chooses the same number of spots for EVs and ICE
drivers. This cannot happen if δ 6= 0.5 as in this case the
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Fig. 2: Plots for α = 2
same number of spots cannot be constructed for both classes
of drivers: at best this can only occur for one class. Again this
result is intuitive, as consumer welfare is maximized when
no firm has market power over another.
Proposition 3. The best response prices in either market for the
two price case is decreasing as the slope of demand in that market
increases (i.e. as α or β increases). The best response price in the
“naive” single price case increases as β increases.
Proof. We prove this by showing that in the two price
case the derivative of best response price for EV drivers is
negative with respect to α, ∀α ≥ 0 and the derivative of best
response price for ICE drivers is negative with respect to β,
∀β ≥ 0.
δc∗i
δα
(Ne) = −(3αW
3
eNeiNej
2
)×
( 2αWeNei +
βWeNej
 + 4)
(3α2W 2eN

eiN

ej + 4αWe(N

ei +N

ej) + 4)
2
≤ 0,
δm∗i
δβ
(Nd) = −(3βW
3
dNdiNdj
2
)×
( 2βWdNdi +
βWdNdj
 + 4)
(3β2W 2dN

diN

dj + 4βWd(N

di +N

dj) + 4)
2
≤ 0.
The “Naive” pricing case’s best response price function
is equivalent to the ICE best price function of the two price
case but with quantities of firm i fixed as Ni and firm j fixed
as Nj .
This means that the smaller the market, the more each
firm has an incentive to compete by lowering price. In
the most extreme case where α = 0 or β = 0, the firms
do not compete at all (as there are an infinite number of
consumers with the same valuation) and set the same price
as a monopoly servicing that market.
5 COMPETITIVE MARKET: NUMERICAL CASE
STUDY
Next we present a numerical case study to see how differing
levels of government mandate impact the market. We first
define some values of interest.
The first is the average price consumers of each class
pay in equilibrium. For given prices ai the average price is
defined as:
aave =
2∑
i=1
qiai
qe1 + qe2
.
We are also interested in how competitive each market
is. One way to measure this is the Herfindahl Index, a
widely used measure of market concentration [32]. Given
the quantity serviced qi at each firm i, this is defined as
H =
2∑
i=1
(
qi
q1 + q2
)2,
where larger values of H indicate a less competitive market.
5.1 “Naive” mandate fulfillment
In our first set of numerical results, we look at all three
pricing approaches in the “Naive” mandate fulfillment case.
For all plots we set Wd = 1, β = 1, We = 1.25, α = 5,  = 1,
p = 0, t = 0, and δ = 0.6. In this case we have a large ICE
market and a relatively small EV market, although the EV
users have a larger utility for parking. We assume one of
the garages is larger than the other (controlling 60% of the
parking spots). We then use the same values except set α =
2. This can be viewed as the EV market expanding (the slope
of demand decreases) while all other market conditions stay
the same.
We plot the average EV price, total firm profits, total
welfare, total congestion (sum of congestion at all firms) and
the Herfindahl index of both markets as a function of the
7government mandate (r). The plots for α = 5 are shown in
Figure 1 and the plots for α = 2 are in Figure 2. The values
are plotted for all three pricing cases that were described
above. We note some interesting features. First, the average
EV price can be lower for the two price case than in any
of the single price cases if the EV mandate is high enough
when α = 5 (the smaller EV market). However, when the
EV market is larger (α = 2), the average EV price in the
two price case is never lower than in the naive single price
case but can still be slightly lower than the optimal single
price case when r is large. Also, for α = 5 the optimal
single price can be lower than the naive price when r is
large but not for α = 2. Intuitively, when the EV market is
small and a large number of spots are allocated to EV’s the
parking owners need to lower prices. We can also see that
total firm profits can be larger in the naive pricing case than
in any other case when α = 5 and the EV mandate is large
enough, though this is not the case for α = 2. The intuition
here is that although individually each firm would rather
set two prices, fixing the price to that of the market before
EVs enter reduces the ability of firms to compete with each
other, which can increase aggregate profits.
Note in both cases the optimal total welfare occurs
approximately when the mandate is equal to the size of the
EV market ( 1α ). At this value, naive single pricing maxi-
mizes welfare even though it generates lower firm profits.
Apparently, the increased consumer surplus from lower
prices makes up for the loss of profits, yielding improved
welfare. Lastly, we note that the competitiveness of the
regular market is lower in the two prices case than with
the naive pricing when the EV mandate is set to the size
of the EV market ( 1α ) for both α = 2 and α = 5. This
is capturing the trade-off of inducing EV parking spots: if
firms start competing on EVs, they may compete less over
regular drivers and thus make the market less competitive
for this class of consumers.
5.2 Optimal Capacity
We now examine the case where firms choose both Ne and
prices. We restrict ourselves to the “two price” case where
we have shown an equilibrium exists. We will assume the
intrinsic cost of constructing spots is t, and the cost firms
pay to construct them p is a function of t and government
subsidies. This will impact aggregate welfare.
We set We = 1, α = 1, Wd = 0.9, β = 0.33,  = 1,
t = 0.1, while varying δ between 0.5 to 0.9. We examine
the effect of two government policies: one where they set
a slightly lower mandate r = 0.33 but fully subsidize
construction, so p = 0. We plot the welfare in Figure 3
as a function of δ with the four possible combinations of
government policy as defined in Table 3.
No Subsidy Subsidy
No Mandate (a) (b)
Mandate (c) (d)
TABLE 3: Optimal capacity results
While aggregate welfare is decreased only slightly for
all values of δ when any government action is taken, we
see a large decrease in ICE consumer surplus (almost a 50%
drop-off) in all cases of government actions, but with a large
increase in EV welfare (up to an almost 400% increase) for
all values of δ. Effectively the government is only somewhat
inefficiently trading off ICE welfare for EV welfare by either
forcing or inducing (through subsidies) construction of EV
chargers. Having both a large subsidy and relatively large
mandate does not have much more impact beyond using
just one policy given: they both produce similar effects
independently and together. However, subsidies lead to
government welfare loss and increases both firm profits at
all levels of δ, while mandates lead to lower firm profits and
no cost to the government.
6 MONOPOLIST WITH STOCHASTIC DEMAND:
MODEL
We now turn to our second model in which there is uncer-
tainty in the demand for EV drivers. We consider a similar
model as in Section II, with two changes. First, we consider
a monopolist instead of a competitive market. Second, the
demand function of both types of drivers will change.
6.1 Consumers
We will assume there is a mass of regular drivers all with
the same valuation for parking, Wd. This mass is sufficiently
large (essentially unbounded) such that at any positive
price, the monopolist can fill up its parking spots until the
marginal value is zero. For the EV market, we similarly
assume all drivers have the same valuation for parking,
We > Wd, but there are only qmax EV consumers, where
qmax depends on the state of the world. Specifically, we
define a probability distribution pi = {pi1, pi2, . . . , pin} over a
set q = {q1, q2, . . . , qn}, so that qmax = qi with probability
pii. The monopolist sets both the capacity (Ne) and prices
for ICE and EV drivers (m and c, respectively) before this
distribution is realized. We can therefore write the marginal
utility of EV drivers (as a function of qmax) and ICE drivers
as
Ud(qd, Ne,m) = Wd −  qd
1−Ne −m,
Ue(qe, Ne, c, qmax) = We −  qe
Ne
− c.
s.t. qe ≤ qmax
6.2 Monopolist
We assume there exists a monopolist who already owns a
mass of parking spots suitable for ICE drivers. Like in the
previous model, we normalize this number of spots to be
1. This monopolist cannot construct new parking spots, but
is able to convert a portion of their spots to include an EV
charger at cost p. This means choosing a number of EV spots
0 ≤ Ne ≤ 1, leaving 1 − Ne spots for ICE drivers. The
monopolist then chooses a price c for EV drivers and m for
ICE drivers (i.e., we are only examining the “Two Price” case
as described in the competitive model). They do this before
realizing what state of the world they are in (i.e., before the
size of the EV market is realized).
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Fig. 3: Plots for Optimal Capacity
Assuming m ≤ Wd and c ≤ We, the demand for ICE
drivers and EV drivers (as a function of the realization
qmax), respectively, is
Dd(Ne,m) = (1−Ne)Wd −m

,
De(Ne, c, qmax) = min
{
Ne
We − c

, qmax
}
. (18)
The monopolist is risk neutral and wants to maximize their
expected profit from the ICE market and EV market, which
will we define, respectively, as
Πd(m,Ne) = mDd(Ne,m), (19)
E[Πe(c,Ne)] =
i=n∑
i=1
cpiiDe(Ne, c, qi). (20)
Combining (19) and (20) as well as the cost of construct-
ing spots, the overall profit maximization problem of the
monopolist is:
maximize
Ne,m,c
Πd(m,Ne) + E[Πe(c,Ne)]− pNe
subject to 0 ≤ Ne ≤ 1.
(21)
Similar to the competitive model, we analyze this problem
by viewing the monopolist’s decision in two stages: first
choosing Ne and then choosing prices m and c.
7 MONOPOLIST WITH STOCHASTIC DEMAND:
PRICING
In this section, we analyze the prices the monopolist chooses
as a function of Ne. We note that once the proportion of EV
spots is chosen, the decisions to price EV and ICE drivers
are independent as they cause no congestion to each other
and the cost of the spots is sunk, and so we examine each
separately.
7.1 ICE driver Pricing
We can find the optimal ICE price by solving
maximize
m
Πd(m) = m(1−Ne)Wd −m

.
This problem is concave in m and so we can find the
solution by examining the first order optimality conditions
which gives
m∗(Ne) =
Wd
2
. (22)
We can plug (22) back into the optimization problem to
get an expression for ICE revenue as a function of Ne
Πd(Ne) =
(1−Ne)W 2d
4
. (23)
We can see this is simply a linear function in Ne, which
increases in the ICE driver’s utility (Wd) and decreases in .
7.2 EV driver Pricing
Note that fixing Ne, we can break down the EV quantities
serviced in each realization into three broad cases based on
the EV price (c) the monopolist sets. We will define each case
by what quantity of EV drivers qe they service for a given
qmax ∈ q.
The first two cases are uniquely defined by a target
realization qt ∈ q. Case 1 occurs when the monopolist
sets a price such that qe = qmax in realizations where
qmax ≤ qt while qe = qt when qmax > qt. In other words the
monopolist sets an EV price such that they exactly service
the target quantity when there is a large enough demand
for it, and fully service all realizations smaller than the
target. Case 2 occurs when the monopolist sets a price such
that qe = qmax when qmax ≤ qt and qe = qr for some
qt < qr < qt+1. This means the monopolist serves exactly
qmax for any realization where qmax ≤ qt, but serves some
amount between the target realization and the next highest
realization in all states of the world such that qmax > qt.
Finally the monopolist can set a price such that qe < q1
in all realizations of qmax, which we can call Case 3. These
cases are summarized in Table 4 .
Case EV quantity serviced
Case 1 qe = qi if qmax ≤ qt, else qe = qt
Case 2 qe = qi if qmax ≤ qt, else qe = qr (qt < qr < qt+1)
Case 3 qe < q1 ∀qmax
TABLE 4: Monopolist quantity strategies.
For a given number of possible realization n the possible
cases can be ordered as follows (which is increasing in
the size of the maximum number of EVs served over all
realizations).
[Case 3, Case 1 (t = 1), Case 2 (t = 1), Case 1 (t = 2), ... ,
Case 2 (t = n− 1), Case 1 (t = n)].
This allows us to describe any feasible set of quantities
the monopolist serves with n target quantities of Case 1 (t =
9[1, 2, ..., n], i.e., the monopolist can seek to at most service
any given realization) and n− 1 target quantities for Case 2
(t = [1, 2, ..., n − 1] as the monopolist cannot service more
than the largest realization). Given the threshold structure
of EV demand in (18), note that for any realization where
qe ≤ qmax, the monopolist will serve the same qe in any
realization with a larger quantity of EV drivers.
We now analyze the pricing in each of these cases (with
a given target realization qt where applicable) for a fixedNe.
Case 1: qe = qi if qmax ≤ qt, else qe = qt
In this case, for a given target quantity qt, the monopolist
sets the price such that they get exactly qt in any realization
where the number of arrivals is greater than or equal to qt.
By setting (18) equal to qt and solving for c, we find the price
is
c∗1(Ne, t) = We − 
qt
Ne
. (24)
Case 2: qe = qi if qmax ≤ qt, else qe = qr (qt < qr < qt+1)
In this case the monopolist wants to set the optimal price
which is low enough to get a quantity > qt while large
enough to get some amount < qk+1. This can be expressed
as the following optimization problem
max
c
Πe3(c) = c(
i=t∑
i=1
piiqi +
j=n∑
j=t+1
pijNe
We − c

)
subject to We −  qt
Ne
< c < We − qt+1
Ne
.
(25)
Again we can make the constraint set closed by relaxing
it to be We −  qtNe ≤ c ≤ We − 
qk+1
Ne
. If any constraint is
tight, then this case is not optimal for the given setting. If
the constraints are not tight, we can find the optimal price
by examining the first order optimality conditions , which
gives us
c∗2(Ne, t) =
We
2
+

∑t
i=1 piiqi
2
∑n
j=t+1 pijNe
. (26)
This price can be viewed as the price if there was no
constraint on the size of the EV market (We2 ) (see Case 3)
which is decreasing in the target t.
Case 3: qe < q1 ∀qmax
In this case, the monopolist sets the optimal price as a
function of Ne such that they get qe < q1 in any realization.
For this case to be feasible, the monopolist has to set a
high enough price such that De(Ne, c, qi) < q1. Hence the
pricing scheme in this case is equivalent to the following
optimization problem
maximize
c
Πe1(c) = cNe
We − c

subject to c > We −  q1
Ne
.
(27)
Again we can relax the constraint to be c ≥ We −  q1Ne ,
and note that if this constraint is ever tight we are not in
this case. If this occurs we will say that this case is no longer
feasible, as case 2 is strictly superior. When the constraint is
not tight, we find the optimal price is
c∗3(Ne, t) =
We
2
. (28)
This is the same pricing scheme as for the ICE drivers (a
constant price independent of Ne). This makes sense as
assuming ex ante the monopolist sets a price such that
they serves qe < q1 EV drivers is the same as being
unconstrained by the size of the EV market.
8 MONOPOLIST WITH STOCHASTIC DEMAND: CA-
PACITY
Next, we turn to the Monopolist’s optimal choice of Ne.
Using the results of the previous section, we can now
formulate this as
maximize
Ne
m∗(Ne)Dd(Ne,m∗) + (29)
c∗(Ne, t)
r=n∑
r=1
pirDe(Ne, c
∗(Ne, t), qr)− pNe
subject to 0 ≤ Ne ≤ 1.
At each value of Ne, the optimal EV price c∗(Ne, k) is
defined by whichever pricing case and target quantity pair
leads to the highest profit (at a given Ne, any given case
could lead to this). The optimal ICE price m∗(Ne) is defined
by (22) regardless of case (and in fact is also independent of
Ne). The overall optimal profit of the monopolist is defined
by the best choice of EV spots N∗e that solves this problem.
This choice also solves (21) (where the optimal m and c
are determined by this choice N∗e ). We now examine an
important property of N∗e .
Theorem 1. Assume We2 > q1 and
4
 (W
2
e −W 2d ) > p. Any
optimal pricing strategy for the monopolist is to set a price
c such that for some t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n, the monopolist services
exactly qt for every realization of the distribution such that
qe ≥ qt, and exactly qi for any realization where the quantity
of EV drivers is qi < qt.
In other words, this shows that under the assumptions
in this theorem the optimal price is always in Case 1. Hence,
to determine the optimal Ne, we only need to consider the
n prices corresponding to Case 1. We can prove this by
examining the structure of (29) given how c∗(Ne) is defined
in each case. The proof for this is found in the appendix.
9 MONOPOLIST WITH STOCHASTIC DEMAND:
CASE STUDY
We now examine how changes in the monopolist’s belief
about the EV market can affect the capacity they can add.
In Figure 4 we plot the optimal revenue function for the
monopolist as a function of Ne with We = 1.25, Wd = 1,
 = 1, n = 3, t = 0.01 and p = 0.01. We divide the pricing
into the cases defined by different k values as described
before. The overall optimal N∗e in each plot is marked by a
vertical blue line. In each plot, we vary the distribution of
EV arrivals as noted below. As indicated in Theorem 1, in
10
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(d) q = [0.1, 0.15, 0.5], pi =
[0.2, 0.1, 0.7], p = 0.01
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[0.2, 0.15, 0.65], p = 0.01
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(f) q = [0.1, 0.15, 0.5], pi =
[0.2, 0.15, 0.65], p = 0
Fig. 4: Plots for stochastic demand
each plot the optimal number of spots is in a Case 1 pricing
regime, but the target quantity k is different and noted.
In plot (a), we set q = [0.1, 0.15, 0.3] and pi =
[0.4, 0.33, 0.27] and find N∗e = 0.196 with k = 1. In plot
(b), we set q = [0.1, 0.15, 0.3] and pi = [0.31, 0.33, 0.36], and
find that the optimal exists at N∗e = 0.279 with k = 2. This
is the same as plot (a) but with a small change in the arrival
distribution (a 0.06 decrease in pi1 and a corresponding
increase in pi3). This small change leads to an almost 50%
increase in the number of EV spots constructed. In plot (c),
we set q = [0.1, 0.15, 0.5] and pi = [0.31, 0.33, 0.36] and find
N∗e = 0.278 for k=2 again. This is the same as plot (b) but
with q3 increasing by 0.2. We can see that even though there
is now a possible realization where many more EV drivers
enter the market than in plot (b), the monopolist optimally
does not plan any differently as N∗e is independent of q3.
In plot (d), we set q = [0.1, 0.15, 0.5] and pi =
[0.2, 0.1, 0.7] and find N∗e = 0.860 with k=3. A change
in the distribution of EV arrivals (not the quantities in
each state) leads to a large change in the number of spots
constructed. In plot (e), we set q = [0.1, 0.15, 0.5] and
pi = [0.2, 0.15, 0.65] and find N∗e = 0.284 with k = 2. This is
a small change from plot d (the same quantity distribution
but with pi2 0.05 higher and pi3 correspondingly smaller).
A small change in the distribution of arrivals in this case
leads to more than a 3 times larger number of EV spots
constructed. Lastly, in plot (f) we have the government
subsidize the construction of EV spots (p = 0.0) with no
change in the distribution of arrivals and find N∗e = 0.857
with k=3. We see that government subsidies can have a large
impact on equilibrium behavior as it can shift which case is
optimal for the monopolist. It also affects the number of
spots within cases as we can see from (33). This makes it a
tool that always increases the number of EV spots created,
unlike the distributions of arrivals (which as we saw may
not impact the number of spots constructed).
10 CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a model where EV drivers and ICE drivers uti-
lize the same fixed quantity of a resource (parking) and EV
drivers have a higher valuation due to the need to charge.
However, to serve EV drivers, operators require additional
investment leading to these spots only being available to
ECs. We have used this model to examine a case where
there is competition or another where there is uncertainty
in future EV demand. The right set of policies (subsidies
and mandates) and the correct levels are dependent on how
competitive the market is when firms are more cognizant of
the ability to add capacity and price these two concurrent
markets (EV and ICE drivers). With a single monopolist,
we showed that errors in forecasting the EV demand can
have significant impact on the charging capacity installed,
suggesting that techniques for improving such forecasts are
worth considering in future work. This also suggests that
risk neutrality may not be the best way to optimize over
this uncertainty, as a different objective function could lead
to a capacity that targets for multiple sizes of the EV market
instead of the one target as in our work.
One key element in the EV market we did not model
is the cost of electricity (we assumed charging costs were
low enough to be considered 0); adding such costs as well
as options to help lower these (like investing in renewable
generation) is another possible future direction.
APPENDIX
10.1 Justification of Wardrop equilibrium expressions
In (6) and (7), we gave the Wardrop equilibrium quantities
by assuming that both firms always served each type of user.
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In particular we ignored the case where one firms prices for
a given class was large enough compared to the other firms
so that it did not serve any customers. In this section we
show that in terms of determining the Wardrop equilibrium,
there is no loss in doing this. In particular, we show that
given an equilibrium as in Section 2, a firm would never
benefit by unilaterally lowering its price to the point where
our given expressions no longer hold.
We show this by contradiction. We analyze the EV mar-
ket, but the same results hold for the ICE one. Without loss
of generality, we will fix the price of firm 2 and look at firm
1’s incentives to deviate. We note that the expression for
quantity in (6) we have implies
c1 + 
qe1
Nee1
= c2 + 
qe2
Nee2
.
Assume that firm 1 deviates from this point and sets a price
that leads to no consumers optimally parking at firm 2. This
implies two conditions hold
c1 + 
qe1
Nee1
= We − αWeqe1 (30)
c2 > We − αWeqe1. (31)
Rearranging equation (30), the revenue function for firm 1
is
max
c1
c1(
We − c1
αWe +

Ne1
).
This is a concave function in c1. Evaluating the first-order
optimality conditions, the optimal price that firm 1 chooses
in this case is
c∗1 =
We
2
.
In order for condition (31) to hold given this price, it must
be that:
c2 > We − αWeqe1 = c1 +  qe1
Ne1
=
We
2
+ 
qe1
Ne1
.
As We2 is the monopolist price, this can never occur. There-
fore, firm 1 will never best respond to firm 2 such that firm
2 would serve no consumers (unless firm 2’s capacity was
0).
10.2 Proof of Proposition 1
10.2.1 Quantity case 1: Exactly follow mandate
In this case the first stage of the game is simply Nei = rNi.
Thus to prove this result we only need to verify that the
second stage equilibrium is unique. To do this we first
evaluate the second derivative of the revenue function from
serving ICE drivers as follows (as quantity is assumed to be
fixed in the first stage):
ΠICEi = miqdi =
(Wd + βWdN

djmj)mi
βWd(1 +
Ndj
Ndi
) + 1Ndi
− (WdβN

dj + 1)m
2
i
βWd(1 +
Ndj
Ndi
) + 1Ndi
δΠICEi
δmi
=
(Wd + βWdN

djmj)− 2(WdβN dj + 1)mi
βWd(1 +
Ndj
Ndi
) + 1Ndi
δ2ΠICEi
δm2i
=
−2(WdβN dj + 1)
βWd(1 +
Ndj
Ndi
) + 1Ndi
≤ 0.
Given the second derivative is always negative with
respect to the firm’s strategy we have the existence of a
Nash Equilibria. Uniqueness then follows from comparing
this to the off-diagonal terms in the Hessian matrix for Πi,
i.e.,
δ2Πi
δmimj
=
WdβN

dj
βWd(1 +
Ndj
Ndi
) + 1Ndi
≤ |δ
2Πi
δm2i
|.
The same can be done with the revenue function of
servicing EV drivers. This implies dominance solvability of
the overall revenue function (as the Hessian of the payoff
functions are negative semi-definite), which from Moulin
(1984) proves there exists a unique Nash equilibrium [33]
[34].
10.2.2 Quantity case 2: Mandate forms lower bound
For length purposes, the proof for this can be found in the
version of the paper located at [3].
10.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We assume Ne1 + Ne2 = K , and so can define Ne1 =
K − Ne2. We will prove this by showing the function
δqe(K−Ne2,Ne2)
δNe2
≤ 0 for Ne2 ≥ K2 .
Using 6 and the expressions for cBRi (Nei, cj) we can
express qei as follows:
qe1(K −Ne2, Ne2) =
We +
αWeNe2
 c
BR
2 (K −Ne2, Ne2)
2(αWeK + )(
1
Ne2
)
,
qe2(K−Ne2,Ne2) =
We +
αWe(K−Ne2)
 c
BR
1 (K −Ne2, Ne2)
2(αWeK + )(
1
K−Ne2 )
.
Let qe(K − Ne2, Ne2) = qe1(K − Ne2, Ne2) + qe2(K −
Ne2, Ne2) and
qe(K −Ne2, Ne2) = αWe(KNe2 −N
2
e2)

[
cBR1 (K −Ne2, Ne2) + cBR2 (K −Ne2, Ne2)].
Using the expressions for cBR1 (K−Ne2, Ne2) and cBR2 (K−
Ne2, Ne2) we find
qe(K−Ne2, Ne2) =
(
αWe(KNe2−N2e2)
 )(
3αW 2eK
 + 4We)
3α2W 2e (KNe2−N2e2)
2 +
4αWeK
 + 4
.
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Using the quotient rule, we can express the derivative
with respect to Ne2 as:
δqe(K −Ne2, Ne2)
δNe2
=
(αWe(K−2Ne2) )(
3αW 2eK
 + 4We)
3α2W 2e (KNe2−N2e2)
2 +
4αWeK
 + 4
+
(
αWe(KNe2−N2e2)
 )(
3αW 2eK
 + 4We)(
3α2W 2e (K−2Ne2)
2 )
(
3α2W 2e (KNe2−N2e2)
2 +
4αWeK
 + 4)
2
.
(32)
For any Ne2 ∈ [K2 ,K], (K − 2Ne2) ≤ 0 but (KNe2 −
N2e2) ≥ 0. Therefore, both terms in the above equation are
≤ 0 for any Ne2 between K2 and K , and so the total EV
quantity serviced decreases as Ne2 increases from K2 to K .
Therefore, the quantity is maximized when Ne2 = K2 . We
note this same proof holds for ICE pricing.
10.4 Proof of Theorem 1
We show that the monopolist can never choose N∗e such
that they are in Case 2 or Case 3 (for any target qt), but can
do so when in Case 1. We examine each case separately to
demonstrate this.
Proof.
Part 1. Case 1: qe = qi if qmax ≤ qt, else qe = qt
We can note using c∗1(Ne, t) as defined in (24) in (29)
leads to the revenue function in Case 1 as a function of the
target k as
Π1(Ne, k) = (We −  qt
Ne
)(
i=t∑
i=1
piiqi +
j=n∑
j=t+1
pijqt)
+
(1−Ne)W 2d
4
− pNe.
This is a concave problem in Ne. We find the optimal N∗e for
this case given a target quantity qt is
N∗e (k) = max{
√√√√qt(∑i=ki=1 piiqi +∑j=nj=k+1 pijqt)
W 2d
4 + p
, 1}. (33)
Part 2. Case 2: qe = qi if qmax ≤ qt, else qe = qr (qt < qr <
qt+1)
Substituting c∗2(Ne) as defined in (26) into (29), we can
examine the revenue as a function of Ne in Case 2 for a
given k as
Π2(Ne, k) = (
We
2
+

∑k
i=1 piiqi
2
∑n
j=k+1 pijNe
)(
i=k∑
i=1
piiqi+
j=n∑
j=k+1
pijNe
We − 
∑k
i=1 piiqi∑n
j=k+1 pijNe
2
) +
(1−Ne)W 2d
4
.
This problem is twice differentiable in Ne, and examin-
ing the second derivative we can see that
δ2Π3(Ne, k)
δN2e
=
(
∑k
i=1 piiqi)
2
2
∑n
j=k+1 pijN
3
e
> 0.
Therefore this problem is strictly convex in Ne for any
k. This means the revenue will be maximized within this
case when one side of the constraint of (25) is tight, which
leads to Case 2 pricing no longer being feasible for the target
quantity.
Part 3. Case 3: qe < q1 ∀qmax
We can show the monopolist never optimally prices in
this case by first noting the optimal price c∗3(Ne) defined in
(28) leads to an EV demand with qmax = q1 as a function of
Ne equal to
De(Ne, c
∗
3(Ne), q1) = min{Ne
We
2
, q1}.
We have assumed We2 > q1, which is equivalent to
De(Ne = 1, c =
We
2 , qmax = q1). This implies ∃N
′
e < 1. such
that N
′
e
We
2 = q1 and thus at this level of N
′
e the monopolist
is pricing in Case 1 with qt = q1.
Secondly, we can substitute (28) into (29) to get the
revenue as a function of Ne when they price in Case 3
Π3(Ne) =
NeW
2
e
4
+
(1−Ne)W 2d
4
− pNe. (34)
We can show that at any Ne < N
′
e (where the firm is still
pricing in Case 3), Π1(Ne) < Π1(N
′
e) by examining the first
derivative of (34), which is
δΠ1(Ne)
δNe
=
4

(W 2e −W 2d )− p > 0
as in our assumption 4 (W
2
e −W 2d ) > p. Therefore, at any
level Ne such that the constraint in (27) is satisfied the
monopolist would increase profit by increasing Ne, and at
any level where the constraint is violated they would gain
more profit from pricing in Case 1.
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